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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to the
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12; Utah Code 1987-1988,
Sections 77-35-26(13) and 77-l-6(g); and Rules 3 and 4, Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals, this being an appeal from the final
orders of a Circuit Court, including the judgment of conviction
in a criminal case and, in addition, where the constitutionality
of a statute is at issue.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the final orders and judgments
of the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake
County, Utah to wit:
a,

A judgment of conviction of Driving Under the

Influence in violation of Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated,
1985, as amended, a class "B" misdemeanor;
b.

Denial of Defendant/Appellant's pre-trial Motion(s)

to Dismiss/Suppress evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUER
1.

Is Section 41-6-44(8), Utah Code Annotated, uncon-

stitutional on its face and/or as applied herein?
2.

Was the trial court's denial pf Appellantfs

pre-trial motions to dismiss and/or suppresp evidence on constitutional grounds an abuse of discretion which deprived Appellant
of constitutionally protected rights?

3.

Did the trial court apply the appropriate burden of

proof in denial of Appellant's said pre-trial motions?
4.

Was the evidence against Appellant admitted at

trial the product of unconstitutional search, seizure and/or
prohibition against involuntary self-incriminating statements and
thereby tainted so as to deny Appellant the due process of law at
trial?
5.

Was the said evidence derived from an unlawful

arrest and therefore rendering the trial court's jurisdiction
over Appellant unconstitutionally void afc> initio?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Constitution of Utah
Article I
Section 12,

[Rights of Accused Persons,]

. . . The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; . . .
Section 14.

[Unreasonable Searches Forbidden - Issuance of

Warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; . . .
2.

Constitution of the United States
Amendment Four
. . . The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; . . .

Amendment Five
No person . . • shall
criminal case to be a
self, nor be deprived
property, without due
3,

be compelled in any
witness against himof life, liberty or
process of l&w, . . .

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; (Also, Utah Code,
1987-1988).
Section 41-6-44(1)(a)
It is unlawful . . . for any persoh to
operate . . . a vehicle . . . if the person
is under the influence of alcohol |. . . to a
degree which renders the person incapable of
safely operating a vehicle.
Section 41-6-44(8)
A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person for a violation of this
section when the officer has probable cause
to believe the violation has occurred,
although not in his presence, and if the
officer has probable cause to believe that
the violation was committed by the person.
Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a)
If the person has been placed under arrest
and has then been requested by a peace
officer to submit . . . chemical tests . . .
Section 77-7-1.
allowed.

"Arrest" defined - Restraint

An arrest is an actual restraint of the
person arrested or submission to cjustody.
The person shall not be subjected to any more
restraint than is necessary for hi|s arrest
and detention.
Section 77-7-2.

By peace officers.

A peace officer may make an arrest under
authority of a warrant or may, witjhout
warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or
attempted in the presence of any peace

officer; "presence" includes all of the
physical senses or any device that enhances
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any
physical sense, or records the observations
of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to
believe a felony has been committed and has
reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to
believe the person has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable cause for
believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid
arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the
commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage
property belonging to another person.
Section 11-1-3.

By private persons,

A private person may arrest another:
(1) For a public offense committed or
attempted in his presence; or
(2) When a felony has been committed and
he has reasonable cause to believe the person
arrested has committed it.
Section 77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to
stop and question suspect - Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF CASE

This is an appeal from a convictioh for the class lfB"
misdemeanor criminal offense of Driving Undeir the Influence (of
Alcohol) in violation of the Utah Codef Sectlion 41-6-44,
B.

(DUI.)

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Appellant was arrested for DUI on bctober 4, 1986, in
Salt Lake County, Utah, by Salt Lake County ^eputy Sheriff E.
Robbie Russo and thereafter charged by formal Information with
said charge before the Honorable Joanne Rigby, Justice of the
Peace, 6th Precinct Court, Salt Lake County.

(Case No.

1759104A).
A judgment of conviction and sentejnce were entered in
said Precinct Court on December 10, 1986, for the lesser offense
of "Reckless Driving" pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement and
plea.
Appellant hired present counsel anld raised the issue of
the constitutionality of his arrest and subsequent prosecution
with said court and therein timely filed his Notice of Appeal
(January 7, 1987) pursuant to 77-35-26, U.C.iA., requesting a de
novo trial in the Fifth Circuit Court.
Appellant was arraigned in the Circuit Court on January
29, 1987.
Appellant filed a pre-trial Motion to Dismiss/Suppress
(see infra) on or about March 19, 1987, whidh was taken under

advisement by Judge Gibson who, on April 15, 1987 denied Appellant's Motion(s) without the benefit of Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law, oral or written.
Trial by jury was held on June 15, 1987.

Appellant

again raised substance of motions before the first witness was
sworn which was summarily denied by Judge Gibson.
The state called five witnesses:

two civilians who

witnessed Appellant operating a vehicle in a manner they perceived as unsafe due to alcohol impairment; Deputy Russo and his
on-scene "back-up" officer; and the breath-test machine technician.

The state rested following admission of breath test

results over objection of Appellant.
Appellant moved to dismiss on those grounds set forth
hereinafter after having unsuccessfully objected during examination to admission of testimony and evidence which is hereinafter raised on appeal.
denied.

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was

Appellant rested.
The case was argued and submitted to the jury which

later returned with a verdict of guilty.
C.

DISPOSITION

Following the June 15, 1987 jury verdict, sentence was
imposed and final judgment of conviction entered by Judge Gibson
on August 28, 1987.

D.

RELEVANT FACTS

Since the issues on appeal relate solely to the unlawful actions of the police officer in confronting, detaining,
questioning and arresting Appellant, it woul$ be helpful to
present this Court with a summary of the general facts giving
rise to Appellant's arrest, the facts known to the officer prior
to questioning and then prior to the eventual arrest.

A summary

of additional facts adduced at trial, although not material to
the issues on appeal, are presented for clarity.
1.

Generally

About 11:00 p.m., October 4, 1986, in Salt Lake County,
Utah, Mr. and Mrs. Roger and Susan Mott were proceeding eastbound
on 4500 South (Susan driving) when a pick-up truck driven by
Appellant turned in front of them in pulling into a 7-11 Store
parking lot, nearly causing a collision.
The Mott vehicle followed.

(Tj:., 49.)

Mr. Mott angrily confronted

Appellant, berating him for his driving actions and demanding to
know if he (Appellant) was drunk.

(Tr., 61.^Receiving no

response, Mr. Mott informed Appellant that hk was going to call
the police.

(Tr., 61.)

Mr. Mott then entered the 7-11 and requested a sales
clerk notify the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office of the incident.

The sales clerk called the sheriff's dispatcher and

apparently provided the truck's license number and presumably
reported the driver as a suspected "drunk driver".

(The record

is silent as to what facts Mr. Mott provided to the clerk and as
to what the clerk told the sheriff's dispatcher.)

(Tr., 63.)

Simultaneous with Mr. Mott's entering the 7-11, Appellant departed the parking lot and drove into a nearby residential
area.

The Motts then conducted a search of the area and located

the suspect vehicle parked in front of a private residence about
three blocks away.

(Tr., 53.)

The residence was also the

address listed for the vehicle's registered owner, Mr. Brian
Scoffield.

(Tr., 88.)
The Motts then returned home, took care of some family

matters and Mr. Mott made a call of his own to the sheriff's
office, adding only that the suspect vehicle was located at the
Scoffield address.

The Motts then drove to the said address,

arriving after the deputies.

(Tr., 53, 54, 56, 84.)

The amount

of time which passed from the driving incident and the
confrontation between Appellant and the deputies was somewhere
between 30 minutes (Tr., 54, testimony of Mrs. Mott) and 50
minutes (Tr., 91, Deputy Russo).
2.

Pre-Questioning/Detention Facts Known to Deputy

Russo
Upon arrival at the Scoffield residence Deputy Russo
had only been advised by the sheriff's dispatcher that a "possible drunk driver" complaint had been called in and the vehicle
description and location of same.

(Tr., 85, 86, 103, 104).

He was relying entirely upon a hearsay report of an
unknown civilian complainant and had no information of any facts
giving rise to the complaint.

(Tr.f 85f 86, 103.)

Upon arrival at the Scoffield residence, Russo and
other deputies entered onto the private property without asking
for or receiving any consent to do so.

(Tr.;, 87-89.)

Mr.

Scoffield, Appellant and another man were standing in the
driveway next to the home.

Russo first approached Mr. Scoffield,

identified him and asked him if he had earlier been driving the
truck.

He said that he had.

(Tr., 88, 89.)

While Russo

continued questioning Scoffield, the Motts arrived and Mr. Mott
came onto the private property and advised Russo that Scoffield
was not the suspect and pointed out Appellant who was standing
some 40 to 50 feet further up the driveway.

(Tr., 66.)

Mott also apprised Russo of the ne&r-collision driving
pattern of Appellant but provided no further facts.

(Tr., 105.)

Russo then approached Appellant and asked for identification to ascertain his name and address.
(Tr., 90.)

Appellant complied.

Russo then asked if Appellant ha<^ earlier driven the

vehicle and if he had been drinking.

Appellant said he had drunk

three beers and had driven the suspect vehicle.

(Tr., 92.)

However, the record is silent as to when Appellant had driven the
truck, whether or not he had drank after he cprove or when prior
to driving he had drank.

Russo also noticed a "moderate" odor of alcohol on
Appellant.

(Tr., 90.)

Based therefore on the hearsay of a private citizen as
to the element of driving (and negligent driving pattern) and
upon the triple hearsay report of a "possible drunk driver" (from
citizen to 7-11 clerk to dispatcher to Russo) and upon the odor
of alcohol (30 to 50 minutes later) and upon Appellant's admission to drinking at some unknown earlier time and driving at some
unspecified time, Russo asked Appellant to "submit" to field
sobriety tests.

Appellant submitted.

(Tr., 92.)

Russo then removed Appellant to another location and
had him perform four agility tests which were indicative of
impairment, per Russo's opinion.

(Tr., 98, 106.)

Russo admitted that he never informed Appellant that
Appellant was under no obligation to attempt the field tests
(even though Russo knew that) and Russo further admitted that he
requested the tests in order to gather evidence of Appellant's
impairment.

(Tr., 115, 116.)

Further, Russo testified that he did not advise Appellant of his Miranda rights until after his arrest.

(Tr., 115.)

He arrested Appellant immediately following the field
tests.

(Tr., 98.)

Some 20 minutes later (and some 50 to 70

minutes following the reported act of driving) Appellant was
given a breath test resulting in a blood-alcohol reading of .11%.

3.

Additional Facts

Although Mr, and Mrs. Mott testified at trial to such
observations as Appellant's intoxicated appearance, unresponsive
demeanor, further egregious driving pattern lipon departing the
7-11, odor of alcohol and empty beer and whi$key containers in
the truck bed, those "facts" are not relevant since none were
known to Russo until after the arrest and, ih fact, not until
trial for the most part.

(Tr., 105, 106.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant will argue that his prosecution and attendant
conviction herein were void ajD initio due to his arrest being
based upon unlawfully obtained evidence in violation of his
rights to be protected from unconstitutional intrusions by police
officers as to search and seizure and the obtaining of statements
and testimonial evidence of an incriminating nature without
benefit of Miranda warnings.
Appellant also argues that the arrest was based upon
insufficient probable cause irrespective of the admissibility of
the evidence and that the court should have therefore dismissed
the charge on jurisdictional and due process grounds prior to
trial and/or prior to submission to the jury.
Appellant not only argues that the admission of the
evidence over his motions and objections denied him due process
but further argues that the statutes pertaining to his detention
were violated and that the statute which purports to allow for
DUI arrests absent the "presence" requirement of the arresting

officer is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this
instance.
ARGUMENT
Since a trial court cannot obtain jurisdiction derived
from an illegal arrest and cannot permit evidence to be admitted
which is tainted by the prior unlawful search, seizure or questioning of a suspect, this case should be analyzed to determine
whether any or all of the evidence against Appellant was the
fruit of a "poisoned tree" and, if so, at what point the taint
attached.

It is at the point that all after acquired evidence

should have been excluded.
Evidence gained during an illegal arrest is inadmissible.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

All

evidence obtained following the unlawful invasion of rights is
also inadmissible.
1. THE TAINT ATTACHED AT THE MOMENT THE
DEPUTIES ENTERED ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY
A lengthy discussion of Fourth Amendment rights is not
necessary.

Utah law does not permit an officer to confront a

person for questioning except in a public place.
re:

(See argument

77-7-15, infra.)
The only perceivable exceptions to the absolute re-

quirement of a warrant before entering private property are:
consent, hot pursuit and probable cause coupled with exigent
circumstances.

a.

Consent,

requested nor given.
to.

The record shows that consent was neither

The officers1 entry was merely acquiesced

Consent must be voluntary and informed.

authority is insufficient.
prove waiver.

Mere submission to

It is the prosecutor's burden to

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543.

Absent

proof, there is a presumption against waiver of a constitutional
rights.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
b.

Hot Pursuit.

This exception requires what it

implies, pursuit by an officer of a fleeing violator justifying a
continuing and unbroken action allowing the officer to follow the
offender onto private property.
exception.

Utah law clearly rejects this

77-7-2, U.C.A.; State v. Hamiltoh, 710 P.2d 174

(Utah, 1985); 77-9-1, et £e£., U.C.A.
c.

Exigent Circumstances.

The di$cussion below sets

out the exigent circumstance element of this two-prong test.
None are present.
of probable cause.

Further, the second prong is the pre-existence
Under no circumstance can it be argued that

probable cause preceded the entry.

(See provable cause argument,

infra.)
Since no exception to the warrant requirement is
present, the entry onto private property to Search and question
is the original taint and all subsequent evidence is inadmissible.

The arrest is also unlawful and the cage should be dis-

missed.

2.

THE QUESTIONING OF APPELLANT WAS NOT BASED
UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THE
EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM IS TAINTED

Assuming arguendo that the entry onto the private
property was lawful, then the next level of intrusion is the
point of taint.
At 77-7-15 and 16, U.C.A., is found the codification of
the "stop and frisk" holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Simply put, 77-7-15 forbids an officer from even
questioning a person unless:
a.

He is in a public place, and

b.

The officer can articulate specific facts which

demonstrate "reasonable suspicion" that the suspect has committed
or is committing a crime.
Even where the stop is lawful due to pre-existing
reasonable suspicion, the officer may only ask for "name, address
and explanation of actions".
The Terry test falls grossly short for several reasons:
a.

No public place.

b.

Those facts articulated by this officer do not rise

to the level of "reasonable suspicion," therefore jrio Questions
were permissible.

The suspicion was based upon a dispatcher's

triple hearsay report of a "possible drunk driver," the statement
of a private citizen-informant of unknown credibility that
Appellant drove erratically, the odor of alcohol 30 to 50 minutes

after the fact and certain vague "admissions" by Appellant of
driving at an earlier time.
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (1985), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a jTerry-stop was based
on "mere" suspicion or "hunch" rather than "reasonable suspicion".

The suspicion in that case was based upon a description

of the suspect provided by a fellow officer who had not personally observed the criminal activity, but saw the suspects walking
near the scene of recent burglaries at a late hour.
c.

Even if Russo's then-known facts permitted a

Terry-stop, his questions exceeded the permissible statutory
scope in that the only ones asked were directed at the two
elements of the crime, i.e., "were you drinking.
driving."

Were you

The probe continued into the demahd for performance of

agility tests, hardly "an explanation of his actions".
The stop/questioning therefore was unlawful and all
evidence thereafter derived should have been suppressed.
3.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE C^USE TO ARREST
Even if this Court finds that Russo had "reasonable

suspicion" to question Appellant, it is cleaif that the additional
facts obtained prior to the arrest were not $ufficient to establish probable cause, i.e., odor of alcohol and results of agility
test.

(Appellant also argues, infra, that tfc(e agility test

results are further tainted per Miranda, int^r alia.)

The Utah Code, at 77-7-2 states, in pertinent part,
that a peace officer may not arrest for a misdemeanor unless the
offense is committed in his presence UNLESS he has probable cause
to believe it was committed and exigent circumstances necessitate
the arrest (to prevent flight, destruction of evidence, etc.)
The 1985 Utah State Legislature carried out one additional exception to 77-7-2 which is unique to no other offense
other than DUI. By enacting 41-6-44(8), the code was amended to
permit a warrantless arrest (for DUI only) even though the
"presence" prong is absent but only where the officer has "probable cause".
Since only two elements of the instant offense are at
issue, an examination of the facts giving rise to the probable
cause for arrest and the nexus between the two is necessary.
41-6-44(8) clearly states that probable cause must
exist both as to the element of impairment of the driver ("offense was committed") and to the actual driving at the time of
the impairment by the accused, ("committed by that person") the
underlying facts must still meet the due process test.

The facts

known to the officer at the time of arrest must be such that a
detached magistrate upon the same facts would have issued a
warrant.

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Whitely

v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
The entire foundation for the driving pattern comes
from an unknown informant who said nothing to the officer to

create a nexus with the element of impairment.
knowledge of the informant's credibility.

Spinelli requires

At best, an angry and

biased informant reported a traffic violation possibly rising to
reckless driving (which requires "presence" of the officer.)
As to the element of impairment, the officer relied
solely upon the odor of alcohol and field tejsts perceived much
later.

Those facts, even with Appellant's admitted drinking,

only show "drinking" or "drinking and driving", neither of which
are crimes, no connection being made.
The Utah Supreme Court has found an arrest to be
invalid even where the officer himself observed the driving
before locating and arresting the suspect at home.

Olesen v.

Pincock, 68 U. 507 (1926).
The reason for the constraint is clear.

When the

suspected crime is no longer ongoing, the impartial judicial
review of the facts outweighs the public safety concerns set out
in the exigent circumstances subsection.
Probable cause to arrest is restricted to facts then
known and reasonable inferences to be drawn ttherefrom based upon
an objective standard.

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah, 1983).

The reason for a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, is to
guard against violations of rights by a neutral and detached
magistrate.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.,S. 10 (1948).

The

United States Supreme Court has invalidated cjonvictions where
even warrants were issued by non-neutral magistrates or attorneys

general.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Lo-Ji

Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
This arrest/seizure was based upon the hearsay of an
angry and biased witness as to one element and speculation (not
inference) as to the nexus of belated subjective perceptions as
to the other.

Query:

Would a reasonable judge issue a warrant

based upon the facts known to Russo at the time?
Olesen, supra, holds a warrant is required due to the
time passage even if the officer observed the offense hours
earlier.

If the 41-6-44(8) exception to presence is not limited

by time constraints, then an officer can make v/arrantless arrests
for days or months following an offense.

He therefore becomes

both enforcer and magistrate.
Worse, in relying upon the complaint of a citizen to
formulate probable cause as to at least element, the citizen
becomes the "magistrate" authorizing an officer to make an
arrest.
Nevertheless, there was no probable cause to support an
arrest.
P.2d

In its recent holding in State v. Mendoza, et al.,
(Utah, December 13, 1987), the Supreme Court found

probable cause insufficient where the officers observed then
stopped two Hispanics with out of state plates (fitting the "drug
courier profile" in several respects) driving a vehicle in an
erratic and suspicious manner.

Subsequent questioning revealed

suspicious behavior.

A "consent" search produced a quantity of

narcotics.
In reversing Mendoza the court set! a standard for
probable cause greatly exceeding the articullable facts present in
this case.
One option which would have remove^ the hearsay/credibility issue from the probable causfe determination would
have been to allow Mr. Mott to make a citizen's arrest pursuant
to 77-7-3.
However, since the officer chose tt> make a warrantless
arrest on these facts, the court must conclude that the arrest
herein was unlawful thereby depriving the trJLal court of jurisdiction.
At the least, if this Court finds probable cause to be
lacking, the breath test results must be excluded since the law
in this matter mandates that breath tests ma^ only be administered pursuant to a lawful arrest.
Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah, 1968).

41-6-44.X0(2)(a); State v.

Where only driving pattern

testimony and admissions of drinking coupled with after-acquired
"evidence" is admissible, the evidence is insufficient to support
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

State v. Boyd, 692

P.2d 769 (Utah, 1984).
4. THE "ADMISSIONS" AND FIELri TEST
RESULTS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY QBTAINED
Even if the pre-arrest facts are fqund sufficient to
form probable cause, certain of them must be excluded on Fifth
Amendment grounds.

In short, once a suspect is subjected to custodial
questioning, his responses are not admissible unless a Miranda
warning has been given.
Custody is determined by that moment, after which, the
suspect is no longer free to leave.

Any interference with the

suspect's intended freedom of movement is a detention, whether or
not the officer actually restrains him or announces an arrest and
even if the officer does not believe he has arrested the suspect
for Miranda purposes.

At that point the answers are inadmissible

if prompted by the officer's questions, rather than impromptu.
State v. Hamilton, 710 P.2d 174 (Utah 1985); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); 77-7-6, U.C.A.
Two levels of potential Fifth Amendment violations
arise under these facts.
a.

Once the questioning of Appellant exceeded the

scope permitted in 77-7-15 and, in fact, focused on the only two
elements of the crime, Miranda should have been given.

The

answers, (as non-probative as they were), were prompted by
questioning.

It is unlikely, from this record, that Appellant

could have walked away unrestricted.
b.

Detention was undisputed once the Appellant was

required to move to a different location and told to submit to
field tests.

Unless the state can argue that Appellant would

have, but for the officer's prompting, walked to that location
and voluntarily attempted to perform those acts, it cannot be

derived that his freedom of movement was not| only altered but
affirmatively scripted.
Since the tests were designed to ellicit testimonial
evidence of impairment and since the officer admitted that the
tests were solely aimed at obtaining inculpatory evidence, the
results thereof were obtained involuntarily fcnd in violation of
Appellant's Fifth (and perhaps Fourth) Amendment rights.

(See

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) holding that search
for what is forbidden by Fifth Amendment is Unreasonable under
the Fourth.
5. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND/OR DISMISS
The burden of proof in suppression hearings regarding
warrantless searches/arrests is on the prosecpution.

Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Part IID). Had that burden
been properly applied, Appellant's motion should have been
granted.

The court further abused its discretion in failing to

dismiss the charge at the close of the state's case at trial for
the reasons argued hereinbefore.
6. SECTION 41-6-44(8) OF THE UTAH CODE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE OR A3 APPLIED
As argued supra, the Utah arrest statute, absent
exigent circumstances, prohibits a peace offi|cer, in misdemeanor
situations, from making a warrantless arrest,

(77-7-2.)

The 1986 General Session of the Uta|h Legislature
created a narrow exception to 77-7-2 by enact|ing 41-6-44(8);
i.e., "probable cause" arrests for DUIs.

This exception was enacted as a result of the Statewide
Association of Prosecutorfs (SWAP) lobby which reacted to the
dismissal of "hand-off" cases by trial courts in DUI prosecutions.

The "hand-off" case is one where one police officer

stopped a driver for suspected DUI then called a back-up officer
to the scene to complete the processing and arrest; i.e., administering field sobriety tests, breath tests, etc.

This procedure

was primarily utilized due to the increased development of DUI
"specialists" who could provide greater expertise and free up
regular patrol officers for general duties.
The "hand-off" from the patrol officer to the specialist, however, resulted in the specialist making an arrest following the field tests (and other observations of impairment) but
without having actually viewed the "driving" element of the crime
being committed.

I.e., the arresting officer was relying upon

the probable cause formed by the hearsay of officer #1 that that
officer had observed the driving (and that the driving pattern
was of a nature to allow a legal stop of the suspect vehicle.)
Since the strict application of 77-7-2 invalidated the
arrest, the charges were dismissed and the DUI-specialist programs were being jeopardized.
The arguments of prosecutors in those cases were the
same as the SWAP lobbyists/proponents for 41-6-44(8); e.g.,
holdings of a goodly number of foreign state courts which determined that in DUI cases the "police-team" concept should

apply.

The "police-team" concept is that an| ongoing crime may be

witnessed by the collective "presence" of mojre than one officer
in an unbroken episode and where the arresting officer witnesses
the final element(s) of the crime and relies upon the fresh
"hearsay" of the other officer(s) as to earlier element(s).

SWAP

also cited Utah case law (non-DUI) which arguably allowed the
"police-team" theory to satisfy the "presence" requirement.
(Citations omitted.)
The common denominator in all "police team" cases;
however, is that the hearsay is reliable because it comes from
another police officer of known credibility Who is trained to
make educated observations and is but another set of eyes for the
team.
Respondent will not argue that the reasoning of the
successful SWAP lobbyists nor the committee Rebates went beyond
"police-team" notions.
In other words, neither the proponents of 41-6-44(8)
nor the legislative framers intended untrained, biased citizens
of unknown credibility to be included in the "police team".
Further evidence of the legislative intent is found in
the only two statutory exceptions (other tharti 41-6-44(8)) to the
"presence" requirement of 77-7-2.
In those two instances, a peace officer may make a
probable cause arrest of a person who is suspected of shoplifting

or library theft and has been contemporaneously detained by the
merchant or library employee since the suspected offense and
until the officer arrives.

Those laws also grant civil and

criminal immunity to the arrester.

(See 77-6-801, et. seq. ;

77-7-12 through 14, U.C.A.).
None of the above statutes allow for a break in the
series of events from viewing the offense, detention bv the
citizen-viewer (merchant or library person) and the arrest by the
responding officer.

If the suspect has departed, the mer-

chant/library employee is no more than a complainant and the
officer no longer has the authority to make a probable cause
arrest.
A.

41-6-44(8) was Unconstitutionally Applied to

Appellant.
Had the 1986 Utah legislature intended to create a
vigilante force of DUI citizen-patrol officers it would have also
created special legislation for detention and immunity as in the
shoplifting and library theft exceptions.
Even in those exceptions, the statutory probable cause
is broken, and the officer cannot arrest thereon, where, as here,
the suspect is not detained or continuously viewed.
Deputy Russo perceived (and the state acquiesced to
that belief) that 41-6-44(8) empowered him to make a post-crime
warrantless arrest for an offense committed in the presence of a
citizen.

By application of that interpretation of the statute,

the law empowers the "police-citizen-team" t}o substitute their
judgment for that of an impartial magistrate which clearly
violates the doctrine of the separation of powers and thereby
deprives Appellant of the due process of judicial intervention.
In the shopkeeper/librarian instance, the arresting
officer can satisfy his probable cause concelrns by viewing a
person who is still on the premises (scene oif the crime) with
stolen merchandise on or near his person.

H|e can also rely upon

a person trained as a merchant or library person with particular
knowledge of the stolen items.
In the instant case, the officer must rely on an
untrained citizen.

(Note the pages of general testimony in the

trial transcript as to the extensive training of the officers in
DUI detection).

He must also assume that th^ suspect was in the

same state of impairment when seen driving.
This officer has exceeded the intended application of
the DUI probable cause arrest law and in so doing deprived
Appellant of substantive due process rights in violation of state
and federal guarantees.
B.

41-6-44(8) is Unconstitutional on its Face.

A statute is unconstitutionally vacjue if it gives
unfettered discretion to the police as to making an arrest for
its violation.

Palmer v. City of Euclid, 4021 U.S. 544 (1971).

41-6-44(8) allows police officers t|o make arrest
without any restriction as to the source of tine hearsay-based

probable cause or to the time constraints.

Query:

If citize n

"A" tells an officer that citizen "B" drove a vehicle while
intoxicated "two months agoM, can the officer make an arrest?
worse, can the officer wait another two months then arrest?

Or
The

statute (41-6-44(8)) allows unfettered discretion, unlike the
limits enumerated in the library and shoplifting exceptions.

The

officer may decide whether a magistrate's authority is necess ary
or not.
Further, the mere exception to "presence" in DUI ca ses
is constitutionally suspect.

Whenever due process is intrude d

upon, the issue of equal protection arises.

To uphold such a n

exception to the warrant requirement, the court must weigh th e
due process rights of individuals against the needs of the st ate.
To pass constitutional muster the court must find the excepti on
to 77-7-2 to bear a "fair and substantial relationship to
legitimate state ends".

(See Michael M. v, Superior Court of

Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
It is clearly a legitimate state end to enforce DUI
laws.

Does DUI enforcement, however, rise to the level that the

letter of the law allows for the only unrestricted "probable
cause" arrest for a misdemeanor offense in Utah?

The Utah Code

classifies scores of misdemeanors as class "A" offenses, strictly
defined as greater offenses than DUIs, (class "B").

Negligent

homicide, assault on a police officer, child abuse, theft and a
number of crimes against persons, including sex offenses are

misdemeanors - yet none can be the subject of an unrestricted,
non-presence, "probable cause" arrest.

Only| DUI.

Absent statutory language placing constraints upon the
arresting officer's discretion as to facts, time and circumstances, 41-6-44(8) is unconstitutionally va|gue and its legitimacy weighs less than the due process rights i|t invades.
CONCLUSION
This Court should find that the prp-arrest evidence
obtained from Appellant was inadmissible in Whole or in part
owing to the unlawful detention, questioning and arrest of
Appellant and that there was insufficient prgbable cause for said
arrest.
Further the statute which gave the officer the authority to arrest Appellant on probable cause alo^e is unconstitutional on its face and as applied herein.
This Court should reverse the convection below and
remand this case back to the trial court for dismissal or such
other relief consistent with the court's rul+ng.
DATED this

0

day of January, l^p8.

LONI F
Attorney for Appellant

z

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

(\

day of January,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with

postage prepaid fully thereon, to Roger Blaylock, Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 2001 South State, Room S3700, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84190-1200.

ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRI$F

1

A

About 11:00.

2

Q

What happened then?

3

A

Was eastbound on 45th South, traveling about 40 miles

4

an hour, and I saw the defendant's pickup (truck in the emergency

5

lane of 45th South, and it appeared, as I Was traveling, that it

6

was not—he had stopped, and when I wals almost to him, he pulled

7

over in_ front of me, from the emergency

8

of traffic and went into the 7-Eleven, on the north side of the

9

street.

la^e#._.crossed___both._lanes

10

Q

How fast were you traveling?

11

A

I would think 35, 40 miles an hour.

12

Q

What—how close were you to him, :>r to his vehicle

13

when—

14

A

I was quite close, I—if he hadn't moved out of the

15

emergency lane, I probably would have hit l^ini.

16

brakes and moved over into the emergency lane, to avoid colliding

17

with^him,

I locked my

16

Q

You then turned to the right as he went to the left?

19

A

Yes•

20

Q

What did you do after those incidents?

21

A

I was furious that this happened, and I turned my car

22
23
24
25

Yes.

around and pulled into the 7-Eleven parking lot and jumped out
of my car and walked around, and asked him if he realized that
he just about caused an accident, and h e —
Q

Now, is the individual that yousaw in that truck
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1

A

I don't.

2

Q

What kind of truck was it?

3

A

It was a Plymouth Arrow, yellow, and I believe it had

4

strikes on it.

I remember the kind of truck.

I'm thinking that they were black and red; but I

5 do remember It's yellow.
6

Q

Plymouth Arrow.

What did you do after these employees had attempted to

7 call the police?
8

A

Well, they eventually got ahold of the police department,

9

and I, knowing the area well,-decided that I would see if I could

10

find him, and so we got back in the car and turned to 2900 East,

11

going northbound and we traveled a couple of blocks, and I saw his

12

pickup truck, parked at a corner house, just off 2900 East,

13

Q

Do you know what the address was there?

14

A

I believe that is L a — a street called Lagoya,

15

L-a-g-o-y-a, and their address would be on Lagoya, their house

16

is facing Lagoya, and corners onto 2900 East.

17

Q

What happened then?

18

A

Well # we took down the address, and we went home.

We

19

have two-year-old twins and a babysitter, apd we went home and

20

got our children, put them in the car—oh, We called the police

21

from our home and told them the address, the exact address of

22

where we had spotted the truck.

23

babysitter home, went down to that address and the police were

24

already there.

25

j

Q

And then after taking the

What time was that?
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1

A

I would imagine around 11:20, 11:30.

2

Q

So, this whole sequence of events np to this point

3 where you were there with the police took about how long, then?
4

A

I never spoke to the police.

5 my children and—and my husband got out.

I was in the car with
Biit I was there--we

6 were there probably a half hour, and finally, we left.
7 police were still there, but we left before^

The

It was close to

8 midnight.
9

Q I

Okay.

But apparently I didn f t st^te that very well.

10 But the time, how long had it taken since y<bu had first seen the
11

car, when it pulled in front of y o u —

12

A

Uh huh.

13

Q

Until you were there at that address and the police

14

had arrived?

15

A

Approximately 30 minutes.

16

Q

About 30 minutes?

17

A

Uh huh.

18

Q

And then you were there another—

19

A

Another 30 minutes,fas well.

20

Q

— 3 0 minutes?

21

A

At his address.

Q

And were there other people there at the time that you

22

I

23
24

25

arrived, besides the defendant?
I

A

At his home?

Q

Yes.
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1

A

2

Q

3

.Uh huh.

That's correct.

And then you came and you taljked to him through the

window of his vehicle; is that right?

4

A

I believe his window was down^

5

Q

But you're not sure of it?

6

A

I could—no, not positive.

7

Q

And you observed that he was ctlassy-eyed?

8,

A

Uh huh, yes.

9

Q

And unresponsive?

10

A

Right.

11

Q

And then the third thing is th^t he had difficulty

12

leaving the lot, in that he drove into s<pme railroad ties?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Did you make any—did you make any statements, written

15

He backed into—

statements or reports or notes or anything of that—

!6 I

A

No. I did not.

17

Q

I see*

18

Did you tell the police officers that evening

that he drove into those railroad ties?

19

A

Yes—well # I can't say that, noi; because my husband

20

is the nn<Pjhhgjh^c;pQkP> with them, on_the_t^lephone and at his

21

home.

22

Q

All right.

23

A

No.

Q

—statement?

A

W e — w e did jot down his license plate number.
1

24

25

J

So, you made no suc^i—

No.
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A

1

Yeah.

We were going eastbound on 4 5th South and about

2

29th East, saw a car parked off--looked maybe going five miles an

3

hour, off in the right-hand lane.

4

thought nothing of it, all of a sudden, he pulled out going into

5

a 7-Eleven.

6

two feet of hitting him broadside.

7

us so mad, because we had to lock the brakes, we pulled in right

8

next to him, we pulled in on his left.

9

are you trying to do, cause an accident.

10

Q

11

We were going eastbound,

My wife had to lock the brakes, we came within about

Yeah.

I, at that time--we—it made

I got out, saying what

If you'd sit and then I'll ask you questions and

you can respond to questions.

12

A

Okay.

Q

How did he respond to that question that you put to

15

A

Did not really respond, just kihd of a mumbled voice.

16

Q

What happened then?

1?

A

Well, we got out/ he had a little yellow pickup truck,

13

I

14

him?

18

i noticed in the back of his pickup truck two six-packs that were

19

empty, as well as what *pr^^r*!fL-*"^ ^°

20

ahouthalf empty.

21

I

22
23

24
25

J

a uy

hiQk^Yfro***"1**that was

Q

What happened then?

A

At which time, I asked him, I said, ajre you drunk?

Q

Did he respond to that?

A

He did not respond.

saying, a-h-h-h-h.

He was kind of glassy-eyed,

At which time, I s a i d , I'm going t o c a l l the
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you observe him"do?

1

A

2

Okay.

At which time, he—all ^he cars were parked bt

3

7-Eleven, at which time, he backed up in kind of a 90-degree

4

angle backing up, hit the retaining wall> which is one of thes^

5

railroad tie things, with his back bumpe^.

6

took off at a fast rate of speed, looked Like he was about to

7

drop the transmission the way he pulled cfut, out onto 4 5th South,

8

did not even observe to see if there was any traffic coming/down

9

the hill.
Q

10
11

At which time, he

Now, you say he didn't observe to see if there was any

traffic?

12

A

He just pulled straight out, no stop whatsoever.

13

Q

Any hesitation before he pulled onto the road?

14

A

Nothing.

15

Q

What did you then do?

16

A

At which time, I was in 7-Eleveii, my wife was outside,

17

I said, better call the sheriff.

18

took off, the 7-Eleven guy had to pull soiree card out to have the

19

phone work, called the sheriff, my wife was outside noticing—

20

trying to find out where he took off to.

21

down the street right below, which is 29th| East, took off going

22
2

At which time, he went

| north.

^ I

24

He took Dff—as I said, he

At which time, my wife and I both got in the car, we

were driving along 29th East, though, hey, maybe we'll find
[ something, but you know, not really anticipating finding anything,
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1
2
3
4

that you earlier observed driving the vehicle?
A

7
8
9

The sheriff asked me, saying, well, there's a

question as to who was d r i —
Q

5
6

Yes.

Well —
MR. DeLAND:

Q

I'll o b —

(By Mr. Blaylock)

—don't say what hie said; what did

you tell the sheriff?
A

I said, yeah, I says, the guy's right back near the

garage, v/hich was t h e —

10

Q

Did you point out who you meant?

11

A

Yes.

I said it's that guy right near the garage.

12

From the garage to the front property line is probably 40, 50

13

feet ; whatever the length of a driveway would be.

14

Q

Was there any question in your mind as to w h o —

15

A

No question.

16

Q

What did you then do?

17

A

I told the sheriff, I said, it's that guy right over

16

there.

19

Q

After you'd explained that—

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

— y o u pointed out the individual!?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did you do anything further?

24

A

He said, can you—

25

Q

No.

Absolutely no question.

Did you do anything further?

|
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1

night, and he stated no, he hadn't been.

2

else had, and he stated that one of the other guys had been

3

out driving, had been to the 7-Eleven.

4
5

Q

We asked him if—who

And did the individual that they pointed out as being

the "other guy" , was that the defendant?]

6

A

That was the defendant, yes.

7

Q

What happened then?

8

A

At that time, Deputy Russo mor^ or ] ess took over t h e —

9

you know, asked him questions, we started talking with the others.

10

Another deputy had arrived in that time, too, and so we just more

11

or less was talking to the others, gettihg information from them.

12

Deputy Russo started talking to him, asking—I guess asking him

13

if he'd been drinking and that,

14

Q

15

previously?

"

A

17

Q

Have you seen thegL fogfnrg?

18

A

Okay.

Did—do you know the two individuals that testified just

I—

I was told who they were, and they drove up in

19

a car later on, and I didn't—didn f t get that good of a glance

20

at them, no,

21

Q

I see,

22

A

But I know who they are, now.

23 J

Q

I see.

24

A

Yes.

25

You did see them then later at that location?

MR. BLAYLOCK:
1 1

i

.

•

i

I'd have no further questions.
'

'

'

i
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A

1
2

MR. DeLAND:

I have no questions.

No questions, your

Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Would you wait outside, sir?

4

THE WITNESS:

5

MR. BLAYLOCK:

6

MR. DeLAND:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE WITNESS:

Yes.
May he be excused?
I have no objection.

You may be excused, sir.
Thank you, your Hqnor.

9

E. ROBBIE RUS^O,

10

called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this matter,

11

after having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified

12

as follows:

13

THE COURT:

Take the stand, sir.

14
15

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BLAYLOCK:

16

Q

What is your name?

17

A

E. Robbie Russo.

18

Q

How are you employed?

19

A

Deputy Sheriff, Salt Lake County.

20

Q

How long have you been with the Sheriff's department?

21

A

About two-and-a-half years.

22

Q

Were you working for the sheriff's department

23

October 4th last year?

24

A

Yes. I was.

25

Q /

About 11:30, sometime after 11:00, did you receive a
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1 call about a possible drunk driver?
2

A

Yes, sir.

3

Q

And what did you do when you received that call?

4

A

I responded to the initial scene <t>f occurrence, which"

5

I did.

was 2931 East 4 4 33 South.

,

-—

—-—"--""'

6

Q

And what's located at that address?

7

A

There's a 7-Eleven convenience store at that address.

8

Q

2931 East 4430 South?

9

A

Yes.

10

It's right on 4500 South, btit the actual

address is 4430.

11

Q

Did you receive any further updates or information?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And what was that?

14

A

The suspect vehicle that was described apparently had

I did.

15

been stopped by Deputy Orton at another addjress that was close

16

by.

17

Q

Did you respond then to a different address?

18

A

Yes. I did.

19

Q

What was t h a t ?

A

That address

is 2889

21

Q

How i s t h a t

spelled?

22

A

I believe i t ' s L-a-capital J-o-y-&.

23

Q

Did you t h e n go t o t h a t a r e a ?

24

A

Yes, s i r .

25

Q

What d i d you find a t t h a t a r e a ?

20

J

(

Lajoya.

I did.
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A

1
2

with some individuals, outside.

3
4

Q

And by the suspect vehicle, would you describe that

vehicle?

5
6

I found the suspect vehicle parked at that address,

A

The vehicle is a 1980 yellow Plymouth pickup truck.

Do you want the license number?

7

Q

Yeah.

8

A

LF 4837.

9

Q

And where did you get that license number?

10

A

That was given by the original complainant.

11

Q

I mean where did you receive it^

12

A

I'm sorry.

Q

Where did you get the license number; was that given to

13
14

What was the license number?

I don't understand t:he question.

fbu by dispatch?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Or was that given to you by another deputy o r —

A

It was given over the air, by dispatch.

Q

— o v e r the air?

17
18
19

\v

It was.

this investigation?

20

A

Yes, sir.

21

Q

You did?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Okay.

24
25

Who had the primary responsibility for

What did you do then after you arrived at that

area and saw the vehicle?
(A

I asked whose vehicle it was an an individual stepped)
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1

forward.

2

Q

Was that person ever identified to you?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

As who?

5

A

As Brian Scoffield.

6

Q

What did he say to you?

7

A

He told me that he was driving ^he truck.

8

Q

What did you do after he said he was driving the truck?

9

A

Asked him to present his identification and began to

10

He was.

interview him.

11

Q

Now, was the defendant there at that time?

12

A

Yes, he was.

13

Q

Where was he in relationship to Mr. Scoffield?

14

A

He w a s —

15

Q

Was he close or far away?

16

A

He was standing about halfway in the—halfway back in

17

the driveway.

18

Q

About how many feet away was he^

19

A

Oh, about 20 feet.

20

Q

Was he in a position where he could hear what you asked,

21

who was driving?

22

A

Oh, yes.

23

Q

Did he respond to that question at all?

24

A

No.

25

Q

Now, you asked Mr. S c o f f i e l d foi: h i s I . D . and o t h e r
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O Q

1

information?

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

What happened then?

4

A

The original complainant pulled up and identified

sir.

himself to me.

5
6

Q

And who was that?

7

A

Roger Mott.

8

Q

Has he already testified today?

9

Have you seen him

earlier today?

10

A

I've seen him in the courtroom, yes,

11

Q

What did he tell you?

12

A

He told me that he and his wife*—he gave me an

13

explanation of what had transpired and why he had called, but then

14

he came up and he said, you have the wron^ person who was driving

15

the car, and he pointed out the defendant4

16 I

Q

And he pointed at the defendant^

17

A

Yes*

18

Q

And the individual that he identified, is that person

19
20
21
22
23

present in the courtroom today?
A

Yes, he is.

He's seated at the defendant's table with

the dark hair and light colored suit.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

May the record show the identification

of the defendant, your Honor?

24

THE COURT:

It will.

25

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Thank you.

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 K E A R N S 8 U I L D 1 N G
SALT LAKE CITY. U T A H 84A01

O Q

—

'

1

Q

•

'

(By Mr. Blaylock)

•

|

"

1

Did you havd any conversation with

2 Mr. Scof field then, as a result of what he's previously told
3
4

you?
A

No.

The other officer spoke with him, and my attention

5 was drawn towards the defendant.
6

Q

What did you then do?

7

A

Asked the defendant for his identification.

8

Q

Did he present it?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And what was the name?

11

A

Brady C. Bullock, it was a California driver_^_JjLoense.

12

Q

Did you notice anything about him as you were

13

conversing with him?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

What?

16

A

That I could detect a moderate 0dor of alcohol about

17

his person.

18

Q

19
20
21
22
23

I did_.

And when you pulled up, you indicated that there were

people standing around there; do you know approximately how many?
A

It would be a guess, I couldn't say for sure how many

other people were there.
Q

I — i t ' s — I donft} remember.

Did you observe any of them to t^ave beer or alcohol or

any kind?

24 1

A

None that I recall.

25

Q

Is that something that you would have observed?
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^

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Did you observe whether Mr. Bullock, the defendant,

3

had any beer or alcohol at the time you arrived?

4

A

No,

5

Q

Now, when did you--do you recall when you first

6

received the message frpnjjAisjg^atch?

7 /

A

_____

It was approximately at 2350, which .is_ ten minutes to

8 /i midnight.
9

Q

And is that when you arrived or when you received the

11

A

We had actually received two different calls.

12

Q

I see.

13

A

So, I was already in the area when we got the second

10

14

call?

call and the other deputy found the suspect vehicle.

15

Q

The call at 2350, was that the first or the second

17

A

I believe that's the first call that I have listed.

18

Q

Okay,

16

19
20
21

call?

How long did it take you to respond, do you

have any idea?
A

Yes.

Because I was already at the 7-Eleven, this

LaJoya is only a couple blocks away, so it was just a minute.

22

Q

Fairly close, there?

23

A

Yes, sir.

24

Q

Now, you asked Mr. Bullock for his I.D.

25

What did you

do then?
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A

I had asked him if he had been drinking and in fact

, if he was the one that was driving the car
3

Q

How did he respond?

A

He told me that he had had just three beers and that

yes, he was driving the truck,.

5

r

Q

What did you do then?

7

A

Asked him to submit—or perform some field sobriety

Q

i tests,

g I

Q

What's a field sobriety tests^f

10

|

A

They're a group of standardized tests that individuals

11

J perform to determine their level of impairment, if any.

12
13

Q

Have you had any training with regards to driving under

the influence cases?

14

A

Yes.

^5

Q

What training is that?

16

A

You receive a standardized set of training from the

17

18

I have.

Police Officers Standards and Training in initial academy;
however, I —

19

Q

How many hours is that, do you recall?

20

A

I don't recall exactly how many were involved in that.

21

Q

For a few days?

22

A

I couldnft say.

23

Q

All right.

24

A

I have, since, taken other further classes and for

25

A week?

Don't have any idea?

certification of intoxilyzer testing and recertification and one
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Q

~

-* ^

1

Q

What was your opinion?

2

A

My opinion was that he was impaired.

3

Q

Now, by impaired, do you mean that he was falling-down

4

drunk?

5

A

No, sir.

6

Q

What would be your—what's the difference between

7
8
9

impairment and falling-down drunk, as youl understand it?
A

An impairment would be someone Kho is rendered

incapable of safely—in this case, safely1 driving a motor

10

vehicle,

11

down; that's a higher level or degree of intoxication,

12
13

Q

A drunk, you have the typical sfLoppy drunk who falls

By impaired, how would that relate to his ability to

operate a motor vehicle?

14

A

He would not be able to do so safely.

15

Q

After the field sobriety tests, what did you do?

16

A

Advised him that I believedheWas impaired and I was

17

placing him under arrest for driving underf the influence of

18

alcohol.

19

Q

What action did you then take?

20

A

I asked him if he would—was willing to submit to a

21

chemical test to determine the blood alcohol content of his

22

breath.

23

Q

what did he say?

24

A

He submitted to it,

25

Q

So, what did you do, as far as that procedure?
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A

1

I gave a copy of the results tcj> the defendant and then

I kept the rest and placed it into evidence.

2

3

Q

4

Now, was the result that you obtained consistent with

your visual observations of the defendant^?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you have anything fufther, after placing these

7

items into evidence, did you do anything further?

8

A

9

I transported the defendant to jail at that point.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

10

I'd have no furtlher questions of this

witness.

11

CROSS-EXAMINATION

12

BY MR. DeLAND:

13

Q

Deputy Russo, it's a little unusual, isn't it, that

14

you drive into a residential neighborhood and pull up and ask

15

somebody to do these field tests in a driveway?

16

I

1?

A
Q

Yes.
Typically, on a drunk driving arrest, what you do is

18 J you either have an accident you're investigating or you make
observation of a driving pattern and you piake a stop?
20

21
22

I

A

Yes, sir.

That's correct.

Q

And so in this case, what you were doing, you were

substituting the judgment of civilian witnesses for that of an

23 J officer for a driving pattern; isn't that right?
24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

Because you didn't have an accident;
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1

A

That's correct.

2

Q

And so your decision to ask my client to take the

3

field tests and so forth, you relied on the credibility of those

4

witnesses, didn't you?

5

A

Partially.

And my observation^.

6

Q

After you got there; but you wouldn't have been there

7

without the credibility of those witnesses playing a part, would

8

you?

9

A

No.

10

Q

Because you never saw my clientl drive the vehicle?

^_

That's correct.

Q

And as a matter of fact, the observations you made

11
12
13

about sobriety or lack thereof, were base4 upon the short period

14

of time after any actual driving may have taken place; isn't that

15

right?

16

A

That's correct.

17

Q

Now, you—you took training, you^ve told us, on more

18

than one occasion, in identifying the drinking driver?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And part of that training, is it not, to learn about

21

the cumulative effects of alcohol on the sybtem, on a driver?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And so you know that if I sat her^ and I drank three

24

beers, the first little while, I'd seem prettty normal, wouldn't I?

25

The first few minutes?
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1 I

A

Yes.

2 1

Q

Later on, that would make my b|Lood alcohol level rise

3

and I might start reaching the level of impairment; isn't that

4

true?

5

A

That's correct.

6

Q

Okay,

And so when you observe a person after having

7

consumed an amount of alcohol sufficient to impair them, it's

8

important as to when, in relation to when| they drank that alcohol

9

that you make that observation, isn't it?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

You—did you receive any recorded or written statement

12

from the Motts, either of them?

13

A

No.

14

Q

I think you spoke primarily witl^ Mr. Mott, didn't you?

15

A

That's correct.

16

Q

And I take it you put everything in your report that

17

they told you?

18

A

A summation.

19

Q

In substance.

And essentially, ^hey indicated that

20

my client, personally identified as my client, pulled out in

21

front of them; j^that right?

22

A

That's correct,

23

Q

Pulled into a 7-Eleven?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And t h e y w e r e q u i t e a n g r y a b o u t

tjhat?
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1 0

5

• • " -

1

A

2

Q

1

—

/

•

•

—

They were that and visually sl)ak--or yeah, shaken.
-—-——_____

3

:

Yeah.

-

-

"~-

Did Mr. Tlott tell you dbout a bottle of whiskey

he saw?

4

A

In the vehicle, o r —

5

Q

Yeah.

6

A

—on-/no.

7

Q

Did he tell you about a couple of six packs of beer

8

he saw?

i

A

10

Q

11

/

/No,
You only, when you asked my client to take a breath

test, you only had him take one test, didn't you?

12

A

That's correct.

13

Q

And when you asked him to take the field tests, you

14

asked him to take them out there in the dfriveway of this home

15

on LaJoya?

16

A

That's correct.

17

Q

And you know that driveway of that home on LaJoya is

18
19
20

not level, it's sloped, isn't it?
A

Part of it, that's why I v/ent oijit to the bottom where

it was flat.

21

Q

Are you saying it's not sloped On the bottom?

22

A

Pardon me?

23

Q

Are you saying it's not sloped?

24

A

I found a — I wanted—he w a s — h e pame up and he talked

25

to me at the street.

In all fairness, I took him to a flat,
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—

1
2

a l s o , and t h a t was t o Mr. S c o f f i e l d ,
words t o t h a t

werje you d r i v i n g t h a t

evening,

effect?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

All right.

5

A

He said he was--he was driving it, yes.

6

Q

Prior to him taking these fiel4 tests, my client, the

He said yes, he wa^?

7

field sobriety tests where he's walking around in the driveway,

8

you had basically what these witnesses haft told you?

9

A

That's right.

10

Q

And what my client had—you'd swelled his breath and

11

he'd answered a couple of questions for y0u; right?

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

You asked him t o do t h e s e f i e l d

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Did you advise him of his right to remain silent, his

tjests?

16

right to have counsel present, any of thos^ things, before you

17

had him take those tests?

18

A

I was still conducting an investigation, so I did not.

19

Q\

So y he was not told that he had c^ right not to take

20

f hose^tp^t"^ i v a s hr?—

K

21

A

No.

22

Q

He's not—there's no requirement |Jiat he takes those

23

tests, are there?

24

MR. BLAYLOCK:

25

THE COURT:

Your Honor, could vfe approach the bench?

You may.
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(Whereupon, an off-the-record d|iscussion was held at

1
2

side bar.)

3

Q

(By Mr. DeLand)

I don't recall if you answered the

4

last question.

The question was, there's no requirement that a

5

person take your field sobriety tests, is there?

6

A

No, sir.

7

Q

And in fact what you were doing was, you'd gathered

8

evidence that you've now told the jury abolut, by taking those

9

tests; isn't that right?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Did you s e a r c h t h e t r u s t a f t e r

12

A

I did not,

13

Q

Do you know who did?

A

I believe it was Deputy Orton,

Q

Okay.

14

J

15
16

tfce

arrest?

no,

There's no—there's no evidence, there's nothing

that's been placed in the evidence room', was there?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Nothing unusual about the truck?

19

A

No.

20

Q

There was no damage to the truck, was there?

21

A

I told you I didn't check it.

22

Q

Well, do you know from any of the reports?

A

None.

Q

And you've told us now, you've tol£ the jury that in

23

24
25

J

None listed on my report, no.

your opinion, at the time you saw my client, he was impaired; is
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